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S t e p h a n i e K a n e
P a u l i n e G r e e n h i l l
A Feminist Perspective on Bioterror: From Anthrax to
Critical Art Ensemble
Not only is law enforcement incapable by itself of eliminating terrorism;
but also, sometimes it may even be incorporated into a system of state
terror.
—Alison M. Jaggar 2003, 175
I n autumn 2001 anthrax was intentionally released through the U.S. mail.With ancestry as ancient as goatskins and dispersal power enhanced bymilitary lab technology, the deadly bacilli puffed through mail-sorting
machines and seeped into the skin and lungs of postal workers sorting
congressional mail. Symbolically fused with the intentional crashing of
four passenger planes by terrorists wielding box cutters, the deliberate
release of weaponized anthrax triggered renewed efforts to fight the so-
called war on terror at home with a special mandate in the area of bio-
terror.1 Since then, basic democratic liberties have been traded for un-
tenable and perverse illusions of safety and control in the polymorphous
name of protection from terror.
Our critical analysis of the interactive fears and responses generated in
and by the bioterror debate between 2001 and 2006 in the United States
addresses the militarization of public health and the loss of human rights
protections. Using a feminist approach that juxtaposes discourses from
apparently disparate domains of art, law, and science, we examine the
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the American Society of Criminology
panel “Consequences of September 11th” and at the American Anthropological Association
forum “Bioterrorism, Epidemics, and the Future of Public Health” (both in San Francisco,
November 2002); at the Department of Anthropology and School of Social Work, University
of Michigan (March 7, 2003); at Boxcar Books in Bloomington, Indiana (March 10, 2003);
and at Indiana University’s Progressive Faculty Coalition Speaker Series (April 23, 2003).
Kane thanks these audiences for discussion.
1 In order to be used as a weapon, anthrax must be widely dispersible.
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rationales and effects of letting the military and private corporations in-
filtrate, profit by, and exert power over institutions responsible for the
public’s health. We reframe the debate by contrasting the government’s
response to perceived threats of extrastate terrorism with the historical
normalization of domestic sexual terrorism, including anthrax-laced mail
sent to reproductive choice clinics. To understand both the deeply sub-
merged and the extraordinarily apparent gendered and racial logics that
structure news, policy, and even scholarly communications in this arena,
we examine a federal criminal case against an artist whose work is critical
of bioengineering and bioterror industries; racial bias in the government’s
response to the risks experienced by postal workers—primarily African
American—as a result of the deliberate, criminal release of anthrax from
a government lab; and the government’s measured response to the in-
advertent importation of anthrax to New York City by an African dancer
and drum maker. We conclude with recommendations for how govern-
ment efforts might reorient toward best practices to promote the public’s
health and safety.
With unprecedented levels of interagency cooperation, new interlock-
ing categories and procedures are linking institutions in diverse domains
ranging from intelligence, the police, and the military to law and public
health. Operating under the general rubric of homeland security, govern-
ment agencies perpetuate the illusion that threats once associated only
with violence beyond U.S. borders have emerged as newly local menaces
requiring extreme solutions, justifiable no matter how draconian they may
be. As Schuyler Henderson says, “By arguing that we are all potential
victims . . . any cruelty can become reasonable in the name of self-de-
fense” (2005, 187). Perpetrators are viewed as indistinguishable from
other citizens: “Faced with such an enemy, every person can become a
potential suspect hiding a terrible secret” (Henderson 2005, 187). En-
hanced with the power of invisible molecular weapons, the image of the
bioterrorist in particular encourages technology-savvy militarized re-
sponses to anticipated health crises while also obscuring the more pressing
need, affecting vastly greater numbers of citizens, for investment in public
health infrastructure and universal medical care.
“One of the less obvious casualties of the September 11 attacks has
been a proper sense of history,” writes Nicholas King. “The assumption
that this event was sui generis, unfettered by context or precedent, has
become an unassailable justification for American foreign and domestic
policy” (King 2003, 433). And yet, neither domestic terrorism nor bio-
terrorism is new. Although disputes around definitions of terrorism remain
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highly charged, terrorism as violence and/or intimidation directed against
a general population or specific group with ideological intent has a long
history even within the territorial United States. Those marginalized by
race, gender, and sexuality knew long before 9/11 what it is like to feel
unsafe at home, on their streets, and in their communities. Bombings,
bioterror, and political assassinations all preceded 9/11. Nothing remotely
resembling a Department of Homeland Security resulted from the de-
struction of a government building in Oklahoma City, however, despite
the rush to distance the perpetrators from ordinary Americans (see Arnault
2003, 174). But ordinary Americans are implicated in the domestic ter-
rorist attacks directed at services for women, such as the anthrax scares
at pro-choice organizations and the harassment and murder of physicians
performing legal operations.2
Those who work at or access services from reproductive choice clinics
have long known terror and bioterror: “In mid-October 2001 more than
250 abortion clinics received letters containing a white powdery substance
and the message: ‘You have been exposed to anthrax.’ . . . There has
always been a reluctance to name these threats as a form of domestic
terrorism, part of a war on women. Instead [each perpetrator] . . . is
labeled as a lone nut-case” (Bell 2003, 479). The pervasive rape and
violent abuse of U.S. women in their own homes has long been decried
as a mode of sexual terrorism (Sheffield 2004), but these brutal attacks
on hundreds of thousands of women annually have never produced a
coordinated response comparable to the unleashing of Homeland Security
forces armed with the invasive enforcement provisions of the USA PA-
TRIOT Act.3 Though we do not in any way support the latter’s extralegal
2 See esp. Baird-Windle and Bader (2001) and Mason (2002), although with respect to
the 170 hate letters Planned Parenthood received after 9/11, Andrea Szalanski notes, “Unlike
in the past, so far Planned Parenthood has been satisfied with the response from authorities”
(Szalanski 2001–2, 32).
3 In 1994, the National Crime Victimization Survey calculated that 433,000 rapes were
committed in the United States. Whereas Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) estimates
suggest that in the same year one of every 1,388 American woman was raped, the National
Crime Victimization Survey indicates that one of every 270 women and one of every 5,000
men over the age of twelve was raped. According to the National Crime Victimization
Surveys, the incidence of rape has been declining in the United States, falling from 433,000
in 1994 to 383,000 in 1999 and to 261,000 in 2000. During the same period, the FBI
reports that the incidence of forcible rapes has been increasing, while other violent crimes
have been decreasing (Greenfield 1997). The USA PATRIOT Act was passed by the U.S.
Congress after 9/11, greatly expanding government powers to obtain information about
citizens without warrants or notification; Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
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and nondemocratic form, a more concerted government effort would
clearly be appropriate to the problem of wife abuse. A domestic terrorist
arrested in 2003 for bombing a lesbian bar and two abortion clinics was
not taken to Guanta´namo Bay (see Mason 2005). Law enforcement is
selective in instances of state-supported and state-ignored terrorism in
everyday life.
When and under what conditions does the state respond to terrorism?
How are particular threats elevated to the status of terrorism? What are
the raced and gendered effects of the selective designation of certain acts
as bioterror? By critically examining bioterrorism as the U.S. government’s
rationale for the massive buildup of military-bioengineering collabora-
tions, we analyze and widen the debate taking place most intently among
public health law and policy professionals and affected communities on
the need for, and alternatives to, militarization in public health. We aim
to understand both the deeply submerged and the extraordinarily apparent
gendered and racial logics that structure news, policy, and other com-
munications on the topic. Our analysis begins with that fateful autumn
of 2001 but enters the bioterror debate from its margins via a disturbing
federal legal case directed against peaceful, creative persons producing art
as political dissent.4
The Death of Hope (Kurtz)
In the name of combating terrorism, laws may be passed that are so re-
pressive or permit such discriminatory application that they facilitate ter-
ror by the state.
—Alison M. Jaggar 2003, 180
On the spring night that Hope Kurtz’s forty-five-year-old heart stopped
beating, “dial 9-1-1” literally brought the effects of 9/11 home. On the
way to the bedroom where her body lay, emergency workers noticed art
materials, including petri dishes containing bacterial cultures. Deeming
her death suspicious, the paramedics called the police and the FBI, which
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act),
Public Law 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (October 26, 2001).
4 We could have chosen other examples of dialogues between feminism and bioterrorism;
indeed, it is axiomatic to our thinking that these are not the only ones. We selected cases
for the ways they use actual female, raced, or disabled bodies and artistic genres to show
how even in apparently disparate and politically marginal locations the machines of state,
bioterrorism, and patriarchy are trenchantly inserted.
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in turn invited the Joint Terrorism Task Force to invade her home and
impound her body, her cat, and all artwork on the premises. Informing
Kurtz’s husband Steve that he was under investigation for bioterrorism,
joint forces deployed from intelligence, military, and police organizations
coordinated with upstate New York courts in launching their inquiries.
Hope and Steve Kurtz were founding members of Critical Art Ensem-
ble (CAE). Steve Kurtz is also on the faculty at the State University of
New York, Buffalo. Working in a variety of venues and media, including
art galleries and the Internet, CAE uses performance art to present com-
plex ethical questions about the science associated with the proliferating
and unregulated industry of bioengineering. The group brings topics such
as genetically modified foods, genetic technologies in human reproduc-
tion, and bioterrorism to the art community and wider public.5 At the
time of Hope Kurtz’s death, CAE was developing an art installation crit-
icizing U.S. involvement in germ warfare. The project involved growing
two forms of innocuous bacteria commonly used in high school lab ex-
periments. The bacteria were obtained from Robert Ferrell, science adviser
to CAE and principal investigator of the Human Genetics Laboratory at
the University of Pittsburgh. In the two weeks following Hope Kurtz’s
death, other CAE members and collaborators began receiving subpoenas
to appear before a grand jury investigating charges against Steve Kurtz
lodged under the Biological Weapons Statute with provisions expanded
by the PATRIOT Act.6 Accustomed to First Amendment protections of
freedom of expression, neither the artists nor the scientist imagined that
CAE’s provocative mission and tactics would bring Homeland Security,
operating through the U.S. criminal justice system, down upon their
heads.7
Why was the power of the state unleashed in this instance of domestic
5 For discussion of their work, see CAE (1998, 2000a, 2000b) and Schneider (2000).
Joan Hawkins (2005) describes CAE’s work: “They formed in 1987; originally from Tal-
lahassee, they soon moved into the Eastern urban scene and became participants in a fin-
de-sie`cle cultural formation. . . . They have made films, done theater, produced installations
and written books. Along with other . . . artists like Kathy Acker, Amos Poe, Patti Smith,
David Wojnarowicz and others, they share a commitment to formal and narrative experi-
mentation, a view of the human body as a site of social and political struggle, an intense
interest in radical identity politics, and a mistrust of institutionalized mechanisms of wealth
and power.”
6 Expansion of the Biological Weapons Statute, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. §817 (2001).
7 For discussion of the legal case, see Schneider and McKenzie (2004), Wilding (2004),
Cox (2005), Hawkins (2005), Hirsch (2005), Pentecost (2005), and Schwabsky (2005). For
an ongoing review, see Critical Art Ensemble Defense Fund, http://www.caedefensefund
.org/faq.html.
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tragedy? How did Hope Kurtz’s dead body come to be defined as sus-
picious? The home is a dangerous place for women in the United States.
In cases involving the death of an apparently healthy woman in a hetero-
sexual relationship, the first suspect is her male partner. Yet when women
die in the home, police rarely take extraordinary notice, especially if there
is no evidence or history of domestic violence. Moreover, Steve Kurtz was
not initially arrested for suspicion of murder. The odd combination of a
corpse and lab equipment in the home raised concerns.
When Steve Kurtz led the emergency team and police to Hope Kurtz’s
still body, the laboratory equipment triggered suspicion of bioterror that
presumably cast the Buffalo home into a pathological interpretive frame-
work. The PATRIOT Act reverses constitutional presumptions concerning
the innocence of those accused of terrorism, and government agents ap-
parently never entertained the possibility that Steve Kurtz might be in-
nocent. Yet to get a warrant to search the home more completely, the
FBI and prosecuting attorney never conveyed to the judge Steve Kurtz’s
explanation of why he had the harmless bacteria nor his position as pro-
fessor and artist. On the contrary, they implied that he fit the profile of
a bioterror suspect, reporting that he possessed a postcard with Arabic
writing while omitting crucial details (that the postcard was a printed
invitation to an exhibition at the Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary
Art in which CAE was participating and that the Arabic was a caption
beside one of several photographs to be exhibited).
Studies of organizational process indicate that once standard operating
procedures of bureaucratic units are activated, it is enormously difficult
to deactivate them, especially when there are important political interests
at stake (Allison 1971). In the aftermath of the failure of the FBI to follow
up on reports concerning suspicious pilot training for members of the
September 11 terrorist team and the continuing failure to apprehend those
responsible for the anthrax letters, members of the Joint Terrorism Task
Force were highly motivated to avoid mistakes and to demonstrate their
crime-solving acumen. This overzealousness, in combination with the ex-
traordinary powers granted to law enforcement agencies under the PA-
TRIOT Act, set the stage for the systematic abuse of Steve Kurtz’s con-
stitutional rights. It also shows that governments must be wary of
themselves perpetrating terror upon their citizens, when they not only
threaten lives but also significantly restrict people’s sense of personal au-
tonomy, producing fears about going to work, being deported, or facing
criminal charges.
The coroner’s autopsy report found that Hope Kurtz died of natural
causes (heart failure). Unwilling to rely on the expertise of the local coroner,
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the FBI had U.S. military medical examiners review the autopsy, with no
change in result. No link could be established between the corpse and the
bacteria. No toxic substances and no public health threat were found. None-
theless, the authorities continued their prosecution of Steve Kurtz and oth-
ers connected to CAE. With no evidence, the bioterrorism charge had to
be amended. Although the bacteria, Serratia marescens, is legally available
from a number of suppliers such as the American Type Culture Collection
(ATCC), a bioresource center that provides biological products, including
bacteria, to researchers, the prosecutor brought charges of mail fraud and
wire fraud relating to Ferrell’s shipment of the bacteria to Kurtz. These
charges deviate from routine practices in several important respects. Ac-
cording to Stan Cox, $256 (the value of the bacteria Ferrell gave Kurtz)
is below the amount that the U.S. Attorney’s Manual (published by the
Department of Justice) recommends when prosecutors consider bringing
a dispute into a federal court. Moreover, appropriate cases for federal fraud
charges ordinarily involve schemes to defraud a class of persons, or the
general public, with a substantial pattern of conduct—not an isolated trans-
action between individuals involving minor financial loss to the victims (in
this case, loss to the ATCC; Cox 2005).
In the grand jury indictment detailing how the organisms were ob-
tained, Cox (2005) finds a dramatic shift in the court’s language: the
neutral terms biological materials or organisms are used to describe the
policies of the ATCC and the university, but the term biological agent,
associated in public discourse with weapons of mass destruction, is used
to describe the actions of the collaborating scientist and artist.8 In the
absence of a presumption of innocence and strenuous rules of evidence,
small shifts in language help constitute Kurtz and Ferrell as menacing
presences that must be contained.
Prosecutors say they are simply enforcing regulations designed to keep
pathogens from getting into the wrong hands. But clearly fears associated
with the threat of bioterrorism are contributing to skewed standards of
prosecution. Consider, for example, that no one has been held accountable
for an incident in which Cincinnati-based Meridian Bioscience sent out
unexpected and mislabeled samples of the deadly flu virus H2N2 to five
thousand laboratories around the world. Catastrophe was only averted by
staff at the Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg, who discovered H2N2
in a sample from a woman patient (Davis 2005, 171–73). Similarly, no
8 The case in question is The United States of America v. Steven Kurtz and Robert Ferrell,
04-CR-155E, May 2004 Grand Jury in the District Court of the United States for the
Western District of New York.
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criminal investigation resulted when three people became infected with
tularemia in the very Boston lab proposed as a site for a bioterror vaccine
lab (Smith 2005). The routine use of the global mail system for sending
and receiving packages containing deadly pathogens is a concern that
dwarfs the CAE case and calls into question the excessive zeal in prose-
cuting it. Yet, despite pressing First Amendment issues and the strong
basis for dismissal put forth by Kurtz’s legal team, a federal judge decided
that the case should proceed to trial.9
Steve Kurtz and CAE have used art as a mechanism of political critique.
As scientifically informed and outspoken artists, they have used art space
to dramatize ethical questions pertaining to the cloning of human embryos
and the weaponizing of microorganisms. They have used their right to
free expression to challenge powerful corporate and governmental inter-
ests, and their work has provoked angry responses. When CAE targeted
Monsanto’s main cash product, RoundUp Ready Plants, in its exhibitions
at the Corcoran Gallery in Washington, DC, and at the World Information
Organization in Amsterdam, Monsanto sent lawyers with cease-and-desist
orders. Until Hope Kurtz’s death, CAE regarded the condemnations and
threats from police, lawyers, churches, political figures, and the FBI as
part of the rough-and-tumble of public reactions to provocative political
art (Hirsch 2005, 29–32). Indeed, in the past CAE has been encouraged
by critical dialogue. The charge of bioterrorism, however, shifts the terms
of debate. Fear of terrorism produced the PATRIOT Act, which authorizes
the suspension of basic constitutional rights. Prosecutions initially un-
dertaken under the provisions of the PATRIOT Act now leave Steve Kurtz
facing the possibility of a twenty-year prison sentence even after the explicit
charge of bioterrorism has been dropped. As state repression supplants
First Amendment protections, American artists contemplate the chilling
effect on critical work. Indeed, some have suggested that 9/11 itself has
caused artists to self-censor and the media to censor, contributing to the
apparent death of satire, parody, and irony in general (Bilderback 2003;
Youtt 2003).
Bioterrorism and sexual terrorism make strange bedfellows in this case.
Domestic violence is a form of sexual terrorism that feminists have polit-
icized, demanding state action to eradicate this pervasive and pernicious
harm to women (Sheffield 2004). Yet in Hope Kurtz’s death, the pos-
sibility of sexual terrorism was never seriously engaged. Unlike too many
9 The United States of America v. Steven Kurtz, 04-CR-155E-01. Action filed January
12, 2006. Because codefendant Ferrell is gravely ill, the case against him is being held in
dormancy.
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others, her death had nothing to do with wife abuse. However, the event
served as a pretext for a search to which Steve Kurtz, having nothing to
hide, initially agreed. Hope Kurtz’s death set interagency gears in motion,
transforming a personal tragedy into a federal case. Long inured to neglect
violence against women, the state had no compunction about using Hope
Kurtz’s corpse to track what it saw as bigger prey. Engendering a sense
of constant public risk, bioterrorism captures the attention of public agen-
cies in ways that domestic violence never has. Even in an instance where
the evidence demonstrated that there was no bioterror threat, the re-
sources of local, state, and federal governments have been deployed for
remedial action. Ironically, this remedy is mere performance, lacking an
action requiring redress.
Calibrating state expenditures in the Kurtz case illuminates disparate
appropriations for gendered concerns. The state deploys vast resources
against a suspected threat in the bioterror domain associated with male
exploits while earmarking few resources for a vast, present, and manifest
threat—sexual terror that endangers substantial numbers of women an-
nually. The gendered lessons of the Kurtz case do not stop with com-
parative expenditures of state and federal energies and funds. The pros-
ecution of Steve Kurtz illuminates the magnitude of the threat to
constitutional rights created by the PATRIOT Act and serves as dire warn-
ing to artists and activists who dare challenge state power during the war
on terror. The body of Hope Kurtz has lessons of its own. Used as pretext
for what was once unlawful governmental action, then quickly superseded
by state concerns with war, Hope Kurtz’s corpse is a map of the contours
of protection afforded women by a masculinist militarized state.
Routine, spectacle, and the anthrax letters
They tested the Capitol Hill police dogs before they tested the postal
workers.
—Brentwood postal worker, cited in Blanchard et al. 2005, 493
Evidence from the government investigation suggests that an as yet un-
identified person or persons working in or otherwise associated with the
U.S. military facility in Fort Detrick, Maryland—a lab that may have been
in violation of the Biologic and Toxic Weapons Convention—appropriated
a small but significant supply of weapons-grade Bacillus anthraxis spores
and mailed it to several people in the fall of 2001. This limited release
presumably had political intent (Regalado, Fields, and Schoofs 2002;
62 ❙ Kane and Greenhill
Broad, Johnston, and Miller 2003; Cohen, Gould, and Sidel 2004). At
least one piece of toxic mail went through the sorting machines in the
U.S. Postal Service’s Brentwood Processing and Distribution Center in
New Jersey before being opened by a staff person in Senator Tom Da-
schle’s office on Capitol Hill on October 15. Although none of the ap-
parent intended victims was even injured, eleven people developed in-
halation anthrax. Of these, five died; two had cutaneous infections treated
successfully with antibiotics. Thousands at risk of exposure were also
treated prophylactically with antibiotics. Millions without possible expo-
sure also took antibiotics. Public health laboratories that tested unknown
powders were overwhelmed. Congress and the Postal Service were in
disarray. Although this was a serious public health breach, it certainly did
not indicate the effectiveness of anthrax as an agent of indiscriminate mass
destruction. Furthermore, “without the existence of a US military labo-
ratory, the materials for the release [of Bacillus anthraxis] would not have
been available” (Cohen, Gould, and Sidel 2004, 1667).
With news of anthrax in the halls of Congress, fear of terrorism once
again was concentrated on a biological mode of transmission that might
be delivered daily to homes and businesses in the voluminous and vari-
egated form of tainted mail. As in the war on terror more generally, it
became difficult to distinguish between fact and fiction, reliable journalism
and public relations. The blurring of fact and fiction in the public and
governmental imagination of bioterror did not begin with this 2001 postal
staging, however. Despite solid international agreement among nation-
states not to deploy biological weapons, President Bill Clinton’s belief in
the need for elaborate defenses against germ weapons was inspired by a
novel, The Cobra Event, which depicted an attack on Manhattan using a
mixture of smallpox and cold viruses. As early as 1998, Clinton started
pushing for stockpiles of vaccines as a crucial part of military preparedness.
Fears fueled by fiction were speedily augmented by rumors of bioterror
across the world; as rumor and reality intermingled, government policy
shifted. Here is one example:
No one denies the threat of catastrophic terrorism, but the pace at
which it has taken center stage as the prime threat to US security
is almost as unnerving as the threat itself. In the media, Russian
defectors talk alarmingly of new strains of untreatable anthrax and
deadly cocktails of smallpox and Ebola; teenage hackers invade super-
secret Pentagon computers; Aum Shinrikyo is said to be back in
force, if not in action, after the Tokyo subway nerve gas incident;
and three Texans are charged with plotting to assassinate President
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Clinton with a cactus needle coated with botulin flicked from a
cigarette lighter. (Pringle 1998, 12)
The combination of rumors and real threats magnified by the mass media
gave rise to calls to reshape public health priorities to address bioterrorism
risks.
Crafting an appropriate public health response, however, is far from
easy. A panorama of illnesses generate flu-like symptoms, which shrouds
diagnosis of germ warfare in medical ambiguities. As a result of the evo-
lutionary trick of latency, effects are manifest only after pathogens have
infected a person and produced disease symptoms. As the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) note on their Web site, the time
span between exposure, infection, and symptom visibility varies with mode
of transmission.10 This time lag makes detection of criminal intent in
releasing biological organisms difficult.
Shortly after the anthrax letters were delivered, the Working Group on
Civilian Biodefenses published a consensus statement in the Journal of the
American Medical Association emphasizing that medical personnel in hos-
pital emergency rooms, clinics, and laboratories would probably be the
first to recognize when a flu-like illness results from unnatural causes, that
is, from criminal intent. The working group pointed out that “the index
case of inhalation anthrax in the 2001 attacks was identified because of
an alert clinician who suspected the disease on the basis of large gram-
positive bacilli in cerebrospinal fluid in a patient with a compatible clinical
illness, and as a result of the subsequent analysis by laboratory staff who
had recently undergone bioterrorism preparedness training” (Inglesby et
al. 2002, 2243). Thus treatment as well as the collection and analysis of
forensic evidence depend on the knowledge and intuition of health work-
ers. Given its members’ role in the front line against bioterror, the working
group admonishes health care workers to develop an “index of suspicion”:
“A patient (or patients) seeking medical treatment for symptoms of in-
halation anthrax will likely be the first evidence of a clandestine release of
B anthracis as a biological weapon. The appearance of even a single pre-
viously healthy patient who becomes acutely ill with nonspecific febrile
illness and symptoms and signs . . . and whose condition rapidly dete-
riorates should receive prompt consideration for a diagnosis of anthrax
infection. The recognition of cutaneous cases of anthrax may also be the
first evidence of an anthrax attack” (Inglesby et al. 2002, 2242).
10 See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Web site: http://www.bt.cdc.gov/
agent/anthrax/.
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The entire response system depends on individuals alert to the details
that signal the index case: an odd patch of skin, a fevered brow. In fact,
as we discuss below, a not-so-alert clinician missed the first cutaneous
anthrax case. A delay in identifying an index case causes lags in the de-
termination of species, strain, and remedy and in all subsequent public
health and criminal justice bioterror responses. In the case of the anthrax
letters, the forensic clue that eventually led investigators to look within
the government’s own labs was the bacteria’s identification as the Ames
Strain. Determining which precise genetic descendant of the Ames Strain
was mailed led investigators to Fort Detrick (Weiss and Schmidt 2001).
Diagnostic and investigative response protocols depend first and fore-
most on infected individuals going to nurses and doctors who may discern
and relay to the CDC the sometimes excruciatingly subtle differences in
symptom combinations and contexts. Infected individuals are assumed to
have sufficient information about bioterror risks to apprehend the need
for immediate action. Yet in the case of anthrax, few people would possess
the level of knowledge needed to assess risk. The flu-like stage caused by
inhaled anthrax is only the first stage of the disease. The bacteria then
allow a slight recovery before triggering the swiftly fatal, fulminating end.
The small respite could cause a mortal delay in seeking medical care.
According to the working group, the average onset of fatal symptoms,
after which people cannot be treated successfully, happens in only four
days. The victims of the anthrax letters waited an average of three-and-
a-half days before going to the doctor. In the United States, in the absence
of a universal publicly subsidized health care system, financial consider-
ations cause many people to delay seeking medical help, especially when
symptoms appear to abate. Although the consensus statement is appro-
priately written in race-neutral and class-neutral language, in the United
States, as the deaths from the anthrax letters make clear, questions of who
gets medical attention, when, and at what standard of care do not result
in race- or class-neutral answers.
The all-white, fully able U.S. congressional staff who were exposed to
anthrax generally did not wait too long to see doctors. The fatal delays
were with the employees of the Brentwood Post Office, 97 percent of
whom were black and 19 percent of whom were hearing impaired. The
general bias in the U.S. health care system against taking the health prob-
lems of people of color as seriously as those of people who enjoy white
privilege was predictably extended into this faulty emergency response.
Public health officials gave dangerously misleading advice, reporting that
because the letters remained sealed they thought postal employees faced
little risk. They failed to consider that the anthrax particles could be smaller
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than the envelopes’ pores and could therefore seep out (Kersten 2004)
and apparently did not think about the likelihood of torn or poorly sealed
envelopes.11 Nor was the CDC alone in its flawed response. Postal officials
knew that contaminated letters had passed through the system and yet
waited several days before closing the facility. An employee group, Brent-
wood Exposed, has filed a lawsuit alleging that the Postal Service delib-
erately left them in harm’s way during the anthrax attacks (Strohm 2003).
A detailed comparison of emergency response based on the perspectives
of those exposed to anthrax highlights incidents contributing to fatal de-
lays (Blanchard et al. 2005). A postal worker reported suspicious skin
lesions to public health authorities on October 13. It is understandable
that the first skin lesion did not signal an anthrax alert. Two days later,
however, after the suspicious letter was opened in the Hart Senate Office
Building and testing of that building had begun, emergency protocols
should have been operative in the post office that had delivered the letters.
The CDC did not pay even an initial visit to the post office until six days
after the skin lesions were reported. Two postal workers died in the two
days following. Selective attention resulted in selective detection, which
resulted in selective intervention and a racially skewed result.12
The tools to decipher this mystery were available. Consider, by com-
parison, that the anthrax hoax at the reproductive choice clinics in October
2001 was discovered quickly. Under threat since 1989, women’s repro-
ductive health clinics have developed handling protocols. Mail is “rou-
tinely opened in a sealed room by gloved handlers.” These safeguards are
in place because anthrax threats are “‘business as usual’ for abortion pro-
viders” (Bell 2003, 492; see also Baird-Windle and Bader 2001; Mason
2002). The interplay of real threats (powdered anthrax as well as con-
ventional weapons such as bombs and guns) and hoaxes (innocuous pow-
ders) all combine to create a sense of pervasive attack. Falling below the
threshold of state security priorities, women’s medical facilities employ
universal precautions to protect themselves. Attacked by domestic sexual
terrorists, abortion providers resist by performing surveillance routines to
provide some measure of safety within clinic walls and doctors’ homes
11 It must be said that the CDC’s communication failures transcended race and class
differences to some extent; the agency’s incompetence was questioned by staff in both the
Hart Senate Office Building and the post office (Government Accountability Office Report
GAO-04-239, cited in Inglesby et al. 2002).
12 The first ten cases of inhalation anthrax included four black men, two black women,
one Hispanic man, and one South Asian woman. All but one, a white male photojournalist,
were working-class handlers of mail or hospital supplies (Jernigan et al. 2001; see also U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights 2002).
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and by pressing for criminal prosecution of those responsible. In the un-
derfunded realm of women’s reproductive health, bioterror has been qui-
etly normalized and safety procedures made routine. Yet in the well-funded
state institutions charged with responsibility to fight the war on terror,
misinformation and excessive delays contributed to the endangerment and
death of working-class postal workers of color and disability (hearing
impaired).
Attentiveness to the needs of highly paid Senate staff and elected of-
ficials stands in marked contrast to the callous disregard for the well-being
of postal workers, creating the impression that the people in charge of
government agencies acted as though some were not worth saving. Postal
workers said that they were reminded of the Tuskegee syphilis experiments
(1932–72), when hundreds of poor black men in Alabama were prevented
from getting treated with penicillin while doctors followed their cases
without sharing with them the diagnosis of syphilis.13 One Brentwood
postal employee told Janice C. Blanchard and colleagues (2005, 492):
“People kept saying they’re using us as guinea pigs. We heard all kinds
of things. . . . They came back down to the post office every so often
with questionnaires, you know, to fill out. They were very interested, but
it was only for research.” Another said: “I asked [the CDC representative]
what made them want to give us the vaccine, what constituted us needing
it. And they talked about a study with some monkeys how they had 3
subject groups. . . . One group didn’t get any treatment. . . . So I figured
for all I know [we] could have been the ones who didn’t get any [treat-
ment,] and they were using us” (Blanchard et al. 2005, 492).
Depending on the actual form of bioterror, strongly gendered and raced
effects can be anticipated in terms of those who will care for those affected,
beginning with emergency room medical personnel and ending with the
women who will predictably, in the vast majority of cases, provide the
bulk of continuing care for those who fall ill. As a suggestive (if fortunately
not statistically significant) example, all four health care workers who died
as a result of the (nonbioterror) SARS outbreak in Toronto, Canada, in
2003 were people of color, and three—Adela Catalon, Nelia Laroza, and
Tecla-Lai Yin Lin—were women (SARS Commission 2007). In 2002, the
journal Nursing Management announced voluntary smallpox vaccination
for emergency medical personnel “because of the threat of bioterrorism”
(2002, 32F). Many first responders were reluctant to volunteer for the
13 The history of racial stigma has influenced the effectiveness of public health measures
in, e.g., the AIDS pandemic (Kane and Mason 2001) and the hantavirus outbreak in the
southwestern United States (Garrett 1994, 528–49).
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vaccination. They were right to be cautious; vaccinations are never without
risk, but the smallpox vaccination is dangerous not only to the recipient
but also to those with whom she or he comes in contact (Landers 2002).
Dual use of the technological infrastructure to respond to bioterror
Bureaucracies fight catastrophe (real and imagined) with routine, which
drives them to fortify and elaborate even poorly designed and regulated
systems.14 The first phase of the twenty-first-century antiterror crusade
involved linking basic communication infrastructure among government
agencies through the Federal Emergency Management Agency, public
health agencies, law enforcement, and intelligence at local, state, and fed-
eral levels (see, e.g., Peterson 2002). The communication web encircling
the skies, seas, and land is deemed essential to thwarting mass disasters—
whether natural, industrial, or criminal in origin. Together with radio and
television, the Internet relays emergency instructions to first responders
and the public. While the public has accepted the need for disciplined
responses to emergency warnings pertaining to fire and weather, mass
communication may not be as effective and clear in reaching at-risk people
in a bioterror event. Hurricane Katrina has certainly shown how infor-
mation and communication infrastructures are insufficient.
Emergency overload can contribute to massive failure of computer
networks and interlocking government systems. During the October 2001
anthrax scare, the CDC’s Web site, the central information source for the
United States and many other countries, crashed—twice. The CDC re-
sponded by creating a new bioterrorism Web page with accurate infor-
mation about how to prepare for and deal with exposure to biological,
chemical, or radiological agents, a site designed as a reference for medical,
laboratory, and public health professionals and the general public. By the
following January, the main site and new link boasted over 9 million visits,
outpacing all other government Web sites (CDC 2002).
Cyberterrorists have also threatened to disrupt computer networks that
control vital national communications. Possible targets include the 911
emergency telephone system, air traffic control and public transportation
networks, and financial networks. Specific targets include the CDC and
FedWire, a money-clearing system controlled by the Federal Reserve
Board (GovExec.com 2002).
The tension between appropriate and subversive, constructive and de-
14 Consider the exceptionally dangerous Meridian Bioscience H2N2 and Boston tula-
remia cases discussed above.
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structive uses of the Internet is often referred to as “dual use,” a cause
of increasing concern to those orchestrating the war on terror.15 In his
annual report to the president and Congress, former defense secretary
Donald Rumsfeld warned that increasing availability of commercial, off-
the-shelf technology to terrorist groups and enemy states means that it
may be used to develop “offensive information operations” that could
disrupt military information systems, such as those that enable U.S. troops
to engage in “network-centric” warfare with other combat units and for-
eign allies (Peterson 2002). Concerns about dual use also surface in the
realm of bioterrorism: “Greater understanding and control over infectious
diseases inevitably leads to greater opportunity for transforming those
diseases into weapons” (King 2003, 438). More particularly, the Internet
disseminates information on biological agents and technology, making
bioproduction capabilities accessible to individuals with limited experi-
ence—to amateurs and to terrorists. According to the Central Intelligence
Agency’s (CIA) National Intelligence Council, “the bioterrorist’s labo-
ratory could well be the size of a household kitchen, and the weapon built
there could be smaller than a toaster” (quoted in Nartker 2005).
There is no question that the problem of dual use makes tracking and
identifying bioterrorists much more difficult. Yet quite apart from this
difficulty, the CIA’s recourse to domestic and feminized metaphors—the
kitchen, the toaster—in this particular discourse signifies a new female
gendering of the bioterror threat. In the CIA’s view, homeland security
must shift its attention from the public world, long associated with men,
to the private sphere, women’s domain. The hermeneutics of suspicion
penetrates the interior world of the household, subjecting comforting daily
routines like food preparation to surveillance and control. Invasive prac-
tices that abridge privacy rights can be legitimated precisely because benign
15 The dual-use metaphor builds on deeply embedded forms of binary logic encoded in
public discourse. Stretched to a variety of contexts, it signals opposing forces, purposes, or
social identities. Although expansive in rhetorical application, it is misleadingly premised on
the existence of coherent, distinct enemies of (and among) the citizenry. To disrupt such
binary formations, it is important to note that the Internet can be used for manifold purposes,
not least of which is use as an activist art space. For example, CAE’s works are posted on
its Web site. “Marching Plague,” a performance piece carried out in a boat off the British
Isle of Lewis, involves artists brewing a harmless bacterial broth of Bacillus subtilis, which is
then thrown from the boat toward guinea pigs floating on a platform a mile away. The artists
mimic British military experiments carried out in 1952–53 to determine if the plague could
be used as a tactical ship-to-ship weapon. In this work, CAE claims to show that germ
weaponry is not only a stupid idea but an impractical one. Such performance pieces constitute
a critical metacommentary that engages militarized discourse in useful ways.
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instruments like stoves and microwave ovens become sources of danger.
Invisible enemies within the homeland and the home must be rooted out
by any means necessary. Homely domestic metaphors provide the rationale
for extraordinary state intervention, even if these interventions are highly
unlikely to accomplish their stated objectives. Equality of suspicion and
surveillance is not what feminists have been fighting for.
Dancing with anthrax: A measured emergency response
In a period of heightened terrorist alert, expensive bioterrorism protocols
can be triggered by any suspicious bit of white matter out of place. Like
a fire alarm, hyperattention can be a seductive lure to malicious and non-
malicious tricksters. While jokes about pathogen paranoia have become a
part of popular culture, false anthrax scares have become a drain on the
budgets of local governments. Yet the search for real and faux bioterrorists
does not exhaust the possibilities of bioterror. Accidental intersections of
nature and culture can also pose biohazardous threats with real epide-
miological consequences. A case in point involves the human use of goat-
skins, which carry naturally occurring anthrax spores.
In early December 2005, Vado Diomande, a forty-four-year-old dancer
in New York City, traveled home to Tousingha, a village in Africa’s Ivory
Coast. His journey took him by way of the city of Abidjan, where he
bought five dried goatskins to make popular drums known as djembes.16
Diomande brought the skins through the Abidjan airport, although he
failed to mention them to officials when he entrusted them to the plane’s
cargo hold. Landing at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York on De-
cember 20, he also failed to declare the hides to U.S. Customs. Had he
done so, the new surveillance routines of the network of Customs and
Border Protection inspectors would have been triggered.17
Passing through the airport unnoticed, the skins were brought by van
to an eight-story Brooklyn warehouse containing recording and art studios
in addition to storage space. Details concerning the days following Diom-
ande’s return to the United States are fuzzy. He spent time at the Green-
wich Village apartment that he shared with his wife. It is unclear from
newspaper accounts how or when he cleaned the skins and whether he
did so in Tousingha or in the warehouse where he stretched the hides
16 This section is based on Baker and Santora (2006), Chan (2006), and Goldman (2006).
17 The network of inspectors, drawn together from the Immigration and Naturalization
Service and the Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service,
is now part of the troubled Department of Homeland Security.
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over the wooden djembe bases. The skins are described as untreated.
(Bleach, properly applied, would have killed anthrax spores.) After stretch-
ing the skins, Diomande stripped off his clothes, put them in a hamper,
and showered. He became ill shortly thereafter.
The minor spectacle of Diomande’s collapse on Thursday, February
16, 2006, following his performance at Mansfield University, brought this
instance of accidental importation and dispersion of Bacillus anthraxis to
official attention. Diomande was hospitalized immediately. By Tuesday,
February 21, the Pennsylvania Department of Health and the CDC pos-
itively confirmed anthrax in his blood. By Wednesday, the case was made
public, and authorities got to the warehouse, where only one of the four
skins, stretched over a drum, remained. The other three had already been
sold as drums. New York City police cordoned off sections of the apart-
ment, the warehouse, and a third building in Crown Heights, where a
man was reported to have had contact with the skins. The federal inves-
tigating team, including four industrial hygienists, two epidemiologists,
one biologist, and one laboratory scientist, collected samples from Diom-
ande’s apartment and van while FBI agents took samples from the ware-
house. None of the searches revealed any evidence of anthrax production.
Diomande was treated successfully for inhalation anthrax, as were the seven
other people who might have had contact with the spores, including
Diomande’s wife, who had accompanied him to his performance and
remained by his side. No one else became ill.
Despite the lack of customs inspection to trigger routine detection and
prevention procedures at the borders, the consequent infectious collapse
was duly noticed and acted upon. Even after almost two months of bac-
terial presence, once response routines were triggered, they worked—
testimony to the improved expertise of the CDC and, along with the
anthrax letters to Congress, which despite massive government bungling
resulted in relatively few actual cases, testimony to the fact that anthrax
is not an effective mass weapon.
Diomande’s case highlights the importance of cultural flows in the
epidemiology of global port cities. The tension between complete sur-
veillance, on the one hand, and the efficient flow of goods and people,
on the other, cannot be readily resolved (Khalid 2005). Like the scientists
who, for convenience, routinely deviate from the legal technicalities in
sending biological organisms through the mail, international airline pas-
sengers avoid perceived delays or obstacles associated with declaring an-
imal and plant purchases to customs officials. Recognizing that the
dancer’s actions were akin to those of many traveling consumers, the
investigating team categorized the incident as an accident. Although civil
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charges may be filed, there will be no criminal charges. The ancient scourge
of anthrax appeared and disappeared with yet another contemporary twist.
In Diomande’s case, government employees manifested efficient inter-
agency cooperation in the aftermath of an international border crossing
by microbiological invaders unintentionally carried in by a traveler. Ap-
propriate medical care was provided, and any threat to public health was
contained.
And yet . . .
Militarization can come in many guises. It can ride on the back of a wor-
thy cause.
—Cynthia Enloe 2000, 32
The present expansion of bioterrorism preparedness programs will con-
tinue to squander health resources, increase the dangers of accidental or
purposeful release of dangerous pathogens, and further undermine efforts
to enforce international treaties to ban biological and chemical weapons.
—Hillel W. Cohen, Robert M. Gould, and Victor W. Sidel 2004, 1667
One lesson from the past century that should guide any national response
to terrorism—and the conception of public health in general—is that
public trust in public health recommendations depends upon respect for
human rights. . . . Protecting human rights is good for public health.
—Wendy K. Mariner 2003, 530–31
In the heightened security regime of the so-called war on terror, three
cases involving biological materials produced three markedly different gov-
ernmental responses. How should these examples be interpreted—as evi-
dence of a learning curve through which government agencies are gaining
the requisite expertise to respond appropriately to potential threats to
public health, or as purely idiosyncratic responses by diverse officials acting
on their suspicions and intuitions? Without far more systematic data, it is
impossible to derive generalizable conclusions from these three episodes.
And yet, these differing scenarios raise a host of important policy questions
about governmental responses to perceptions of threat and about the
militarization of public health.
One key question involves the fundamental meaning of public health.
It is crucial to distinguish between “the public’s health,” which entails
versatile, locally organized practices and principles to foster personal health
and autonomy, disease prevention, and treatment, and “Public Health,”
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which Lawrence O. Gostin and his associates (2002) believe requires cen-
tralized authorities with emergency powers to manage vaccines, medicines,
hospital beds, quarantines, and morgues and to coerce if necessary those
individuals who refuse to comply with the dominant representation of the
common good.18 Discourses on bioterror preparedness tend to conflate
these disparate meanings, suggesting that concern with the latter will
promote the former. The first two case studies in this article raise concerns
about the validity of that assumption.
The Kurtz case and the case of the anthrax letters illuminate an ex-
panding array of semisecret, public-private, medical-military partnerships
that require vast expenditures of funds for their operations. In a world of
limited resources, monies expended on bioterrorism preparedness are di-
verted from funding for basic public health infrastructure and health care
systems, producing markedly inequitable outcomes, especially for the
poor, who are most dependent on the public health system. Recent federal
legislation highlights these distributional inequities. When the U.S. Senate
in a 99–0 vote joined the House of Representatives in approving “Project
BioShield,” legislation funding research, production, and stockpiling of
vaccines and antidotes for bioterror agents, it allocated billions of dollars
to pharmaceutical companies while simultaneously relaxing regulatory
controls and eliminating liability for the production of harmful or inef-
fective vaccines (Holland 2004).
Exclusive focus on bioterror preparedness tends to promote excessive
confidence in the power of scientists to create and control microbial weap-
ons while converting them to beneficial uses. Yet that confidence elides
a host of historical, environmental, and political issues. In the 1950s and
1960s, before international conventions brought a halt to biological and
chemical weapons production, scientists at Fort Detrick produced more
than three tons of microbes, including anthrax, tularemia, and brucellosis,
precisely the same lethal biological weapons that Americans were told they
had to invade Iraq to destroy (Regis 2004). “Biodefense for the 21st
Century,” a classified document prepared by the George W. Bush ad-
ministration, proposes that the Defense Department build a national bio-
forensics analysis facility at Fort Detrick, the very source of the intentional
anthrax release in October 2001 (Webb 2004).19
Despite unresolved questions concerning culpability for this real act of
18 Paula Allen-Meares, dean and Norma Radin Collegiate Professor of Social Work at
the University of Michigan, referred to institutional differences between “public health” and
“the public’s health” (personal communication, March 7, 2003).
19 The budget for the new Fort Detrick lab is $128 million (Warrick 2006).
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bioterror, the government is confident that the military can ensure a safe
transition from producing germ warfare agents to producing germ warfare
vaccines, when the latter requires the production, shipment, and storage
of the former. Despite a long history of accidents, the government is
confident that the military will be able to control accidental and intentional
criminal releases (see Cohen, Gould, and Sidel 2004; Regis 2004; Thacker
n.d.). Nor is Fort Detrick the only proposed site for bioterrorism pre-
paredness operations. A number of Biohazard Level 4 and 5 research sites
may be scattered throughout the country, including in the middle of dense
urban neighborhoods (Byravan and Krimsky 2003). Beyond critical ques-
tions concerning public safety should there be accidental or criminal re-
lease of such toxins, the proliferation of these facilities raises issues of
international law. The Bush administration claims that this research com-
plies with the Biological Toxin Weapons Convention, which outlaws the
manufacture of biological weapons, but that treaty makes no distinction
between defensive and offensive intentions.20
As interagency cooperation develops in bioterror efforts, public health
funds are disbursed across an array of institutions for purposes at some
remove from the public’s health. Consider, for example, the bioterror
preparedness program BioSense, a plan that moves money from budgets
in states where bioterrorism is not deemed a threat to locations where it
is, to provide funds for certain services in the event of an attack. BioSense
provides funds to post offices to deliver medicine. It also provides funds
for public health agents to detain infected and exposed persons in federal
quarantine, expanding the prison-industrial complex with what in effect
will be temporary medical prisons. A broad assortment of public health
advocacy groups, including the American Public Health Association, op-
posed shifting funds away from states with “ongoing areas of vulnerability”
(McGlinchey 2004). In developing their arguments against BioSense,
however, public health advocacy groups adopted the terms of debate set
by military planners. Areas of vulnerability is not the term in which public
health professionals typically describe the health needs of the U.S. pop-
ulation. Preoccupation with bioterror preparedness contributes to a mil-
itarization of public health discourses even among those explicitly opposed
to specific government public health plans.
As the boundaries blur between measures to enhance the public’s health
20 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, April 10, 1972,
26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163. See also David Fidler, Indiana University School of Law
professor, quoted in Warrick (2006).
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and measures to promote militarized public health, those most in need
of public provision of medical care lose ground. The specter of anthrax
and other potential microbial weapons displaces concern in minds and
budgets with the prevention and management of diseases endemic to
poverty with known treatments or cures (e.g., AIDS, cholera, dysentery,
malaria, measles, and multidrug-resistant tuberculosis).
The social control measures associated with emergency powers exer-
cised in periods of crisis do not respect individual rights. As the Kurtz
case so graphically demonstrates, individual rights and constitutional pro-
tections may be jettisoned when overzealous government agencies seek
to protect the public from the threat of bioterror. As an orientation guid-
ing law and policy, fear has corrosive effects. Authorizing state officials to
use coercion to enforce compliance with government conceptions of the
public good is unlikely to foster respect for individual health and auton-
omy. Nor is it likely to produce policies that enhance public safety. By
increasing the number of facilities producing microbial agents in order to
develop vaccines, the government also increases the possibility of lethal
accidents. Militarization of public health is a fear-based response to bio-
terror risk. It should never be confused with best practices in the provision
of public health. Emergency prevention and management should be as-
pects of public health planning, but they should not become a substitute
for sustained efforts to improve and extend health care and communi-
cation infrastructure and expertise to benefit all members of the public,
whose health needs vastly exceed threats of bioterror.
The three cases discussed in this article do not represent a totality of
response possibilities. But they show how official discourse and action are
always performed on a stage made uneven by social inequality. No matter
the extent of education and exercise, protocols for defining certain situ-
ations as risky, whether they involve crime, illness, accident, useful science,
performance art, or some combination of the above, are dependent on
interpretation. To the degree that social actors in positions of power and
responsibility allow their conscious or unconscious racial, gender, and/or
political biases to affect their decision making, the protocols’ implemen-
tation will be idiosyncratic and subject to abuse. The narrower and more
blurry the boundary between the institutionalization of measures to en-
hance the public’s health, on one hand, and a militarized public health
colossus, on the other, the greater the destructive potential of current
bioterror initiatives, both for those whose identities and social locations
render them most susceptible to official procedures’ vicissitudes and for
society more generally.
Procedures—what must happen, and how—will vary tremendously. No
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grand plan can apply equally well to mass emergencies as different as Ebola
or tuberculosis in New York, United States, or in Tousingha, Ivory Coast.
Nevertheless, if laws and policies are not applied equitably and justly, they
enhance the mechanisms of antidemocratic forces. As the AIDS epidemic
has taught, effective public health law, even in a bioterror crisis, must put
the protection of infected persons’ human rights at the center (Burris,
Dalton, and Miller 1993): “Public health is not our only social value. And
government is not always as beneficent as public health officials and ad-
vocates may assume. If public health fails to take human rights into ac-
count, it will too often view social policy choices as a conflict between
health and liberty” (Mariner 2003, 551; see also Annas 2002). Just as
the dominant public health model rejects the criminalization of HIV-
positive persons even though among them a malicious intentional infector
may walk (Kane 1998), so that model should resist militarization as a
response to fear of infected/infecting mass avengers.
It is crucial to critically and holistically examine the practical and ethical
implications of all technological innovations that may adversely affect liv-
ing organisms and environments, not only in relation to bioterror but
also in relation to global biosafety and biodiversity issues (e.g., biopiracy,
genetic and nuclear engineering, and the use of contaminated medical
products). Fear of the intentionally infected and infecting avenger must
be coupled with a healthy skepticism about the bioterror paradigm. In-
vestment in the bioterror industry should not proceed without larger
investments in human and environmental health. Bioengineering and
chemical production industries, civil and military, should be required to
abide by precautionary principles when introducing genetic alterations
and toxic substances into the air, water, and earth. It would be foolish to
leave food and water supplies unprotected from terrorist attack (see, e.g.,
Francis 2005; Meinhardt 2005), but neither should governments and
citizens continue to allow damage from toxic industrial pollution in profit’s
name.
Analysis of past emergencies shows that ordinary people generally be-
have rationally if they have survival tools.21 As an orientation guiding law
and policy, trust remains more pragmatic than fear. Rather than pouring
public funds into secret germ-production facilities, a feminist perspective
calls for improving and extending health care and communication infra-
21 See expert in bioterrorism, anthropologist, and senior associate at the Center for
Biosecurity at University of Pittsburgh Medical Centre Monica Schoch-Spana’s December
14, 2006, briefing to the Democratic Caucus of the House Committee on Science, which
presents plans for participatory governance in health emergencies (Nuti 2006).
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structure and expertise to benefit all, regardless of class and citizenship
status. Emergency prevention and management should be an aspect of,
not a substitute for, this global survival project—for, although we focus
here on events in the United States, our discussion’s implications are global
in scope. People free to be creative and critical, who engage in dialogue
and performance across areas of expertise, disciplines, and social and po-
litical identities, are most likely to make a safer society possible. Activism,
art, and good science, including social science, are essential elements of
a successful public move to impose limits on or—dare we hope—derail
the apparently mindless expansion of the bioterror industry. Artists, sci-
entists, those in the healing professions, those in the law, and of course
feminists who work toward a grounded, egalitarian vision of the public
good must with haste engage vigorously in the bioterror debate.
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